First, the provisions of the LRA did not arise in this case.  The remedy sought by Mr Le Grange was not ‘re-instatement’ to a position previously held with the municipality; nor did he seek renewal of the expired agreement.  What he sought was specific performance of clause 2.3.1 of the agreement as reflected in the declaratory order.  In Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC) the Constitutional Court explained the basis on which the nature of issues raised in proceedings must be determined.

That court held that jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the pleadings and not on the substantive merits of the case.  Mr Le Grange had pleaded, as the relief he sought, the common law remedy of specific performance, based on the fact that the municipality was obliged, in terms of the agreement, to employ him after 30 June 2012.  The fact that the relief sought related to employment did not necessarily mean that it was rooted in the provisions of the LRA.  And the fact that Mr Le Grange had been employed by the municipality prior to 30 June 2012 did not mean that he was seeking re-instatement.

Acting justice of appeal Dambuza in Greater Tzaneen Municipality v Le Grange (685/2013) [2015] ZASCA 17 (18 March 2015) at para 11.