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Important to note the following extracts from Sali v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and Others [2014] ZACC 19 [19 June 2014] in the main judgment of Jafta J which were not questioned in the majority judgment of Cameron J.
Extracts
[2] The case is brought before this Court as an application for leave to appeal against the order of the Labour Court in terms of which the applicant’s claim was dismissed. Both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court refused him leave to appeal. He contended that it was not necessary for him to approach the Supreme Court of Appeal before coming to this Court because, as from 23 August 2013, the Supreme Court of Appeal no longer has the competence to decide appeals from the Labour Courts.
. . . .
[41] The matter does not raise an issue in respect of which the Supreme Court of Appeal has special expertise. Instead, it raises a constitutional issue in the employment setting. Moreover, the applicant did not approach this Court directly from the Labour Court. He went to the Labour Appeal Court which denied him leave to appeal. The Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court are specialist courts established to decide labour matters. Those are the courts in which our labour law jurisprudence is developed.
[42] In any event the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution suggests that in appropriate cases appeals from the Labour Appeal Court may come directly to this Court. However, it is not necessary to determine whether this case falls within the ambit of the Seventeenth Amendment. In the view I take, leave to appeal must be granted.
. . . .
CAMERON J (Moseneke ACJ, Skweyiya ADCJ, Dambuza AJ, Froneman J, Khampepe J, Madlanga J, Majiedt AJ, Van der Westhuizen J and Zondo J concurring):
[90] But the main judgment finds for Mr Sali on a basis he never argued. He did not attack the Commissioner’s power to waive the 30-year age limit conditionally. Nor did any party suggest that that power of waiver amounted to an amendment of the Regulations. For this and other reasons, I do not agree with the main judgment’s outcome, or its reasoning for it. However, I gratefully adopt its exposition of the facts and litigation history, save that I do not accept that in setting the age limit of 40 the Commissioner purported to amend the Regulations. Like the main judgment, I am prepared to assume, without deciding, that Mr Sali was entitled to bypass the Supreme Court of Appeal.